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"FEDERALIZING" IMMIGRATION LAW:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A LIMITATION ON
CONGRESS'S POWER TO LEGISLATE IN THE
FIELD OF IMMIGRATION
Shayana Kadidal*
INTRODUCTION
Immigration is almost always a good thing for countries.' The economic
case is the easiest one to make: most conservative scholars will tell you
that even uncontrolled illegal immigration is an unalloyed benefit for the
economies of the countries that take in immigrants. 2 That is particularly
* Senior Managing Attorney, Guantdinamo Global Justice Initiative, Center for
Constitutional Rights, New York City; J.D., Yale, 1994. The views expressed herein are not
those of the author's employer, nor, if later proven incorrect, of the author.
Much of the discussion of the retroactivity cases in Part I of this piece and the
substantive international law standards in Part III derives from briefs the Center submitted in
Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003), Gordon v. Mul, 153 F. App'x 39 (2d Cir.
2005), and Lake v. Gonzales, Nos. 05-4204-ag & 05-4403-ag, (2d Cir.), consolidated on
appeal with Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), and the cases of four other
petitioners). Those briefs were the product of the collective labors of attorneys and law
students at the Center-Jennifer M. Green, Claire Tixeire, Rachel Meeropol, Maria Couri
LaHood, and Lara Rabiee-as well as various wonderful attorneys we have worked with on
a regular basis: Claudia Slovinsky, Beth Stephens, William Aceves, and the late John D.B.
Lewis.
1. See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok, Economic and Moral Factors in Favor of Open
Immigration, INDEP. INST., Sept. 14, 2000, http://www.independent.org/issues/article.
asp?id=486 ("Virtually all economists agree that immigration increases the wealth of the
United States. For example a group of economists all of whom had been either president of
the American Economic Association or a member of the President's Council of Economic
Advisors, were asked 'On balance, what effect has twentieth century immigration had on the
nation's economic growth.' 81% of these prominent economists answered 'very favorable,'
19% said slightly favorable, not a single one said slightly or very unfavorable.").
2. See, e.g., PHILLIPPE LEGRAIN, IMMIGRANTS: YOUR COUNTRY NEEDS THEM 19 (2007)
("The World Bank reckons that if rich countries allowed their workforce to swell by a mere
3 per cent by letting in an extra 14 million workers from developing countries between 2001
and 2025, the world would be $356 billion a year better off, with the new migrants
themselves gaining $162 billion a year, people who remain in poor countries $143 billion,
and natives in rich countries $139 billion."); JULIAN L. SIMON, IMMIGRATION: THE
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1995), http://www.cato.org/
pubs/policy-report/pr-immig.html ("Immigrants do not increase the rate of unemployment
among native Americans, even among minority, female, and low-skill workers. The effect
of immigration on wages is negative for some of these special groups and positive for others,
but the overall effects are small. Total per capita government expenditures on immigrants
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true for developed countries, where reproductive rates generally drop as the
average income rises, a trend that tends to raise the average age of the
native population and to correspondingly reduce the ratio of workers to
retirees, which in turn strains retirement systems (both private and public)
and weighs down public finances. Immigrants tend to be younger than
average when they arrive, and tend to have more children, helping counter
the demographic impact of an increasingly aged native population. The
increase in population in absolute terms also helps nations avoid the
"French Disease" whereby negative population growth makes it impossible
to keep pace with rival nations' total GDP.3 Not all of the benefits are
exclusive to modem, developed societies; perhaps the best evidence of this
is that the Founders, in the Declaration of Independence, faulted the King
for discouraging migration to the colonies.4
Despite this, immigration law in the United States has for the last several
decades been characterized by a one-way downward spiral, as citizen-voters
in federal elections consistently approve ever more draconian laws aimed at
keeping immigrants from coming here in the first place or kicking those
already here out. A pair of laws enacted in 1996 under President William J.
Clinton's signature, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), marked a sea-change in immigration
law for noncitizens in deportation proceedings. Notably, the IIRIRA in
particular repealed schemes that had previously allowed immigration judges
to grant, on a case-by-case basis, discretionary relief for almost half of all
otherwise-deportable aliens. Prior to 1996, one of the more common
triggers for such discretionary relief was the presence of family connections
that deportation would rend asunder--connections to spouses or children
who would be left behind in the United States. For large categories of
removable aliens, that form of discretionary relief disappeared with AEDPA
and the IIRIRA. We can expect little better in the future from federal
legislators, as aliens form a convenient electoral target, absorbing blame for
everything from unemployment to social disorder and crime to declining
schools.
are much lower than those for natives, no matter how immigrants are classified.... Natural
resources and the environment are not at risk from immigration."); Tabarrok, supra note 1.
3. See James F. Hollifeld, Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden
Consensus, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 145 (Wayne A.
Cornelius et al. eds., 1st ed. 1994) ("To sustain the surge in economic growth during the
belle 6poque ... French industrialists needed access to additional supplies of labor, which
they had great difficulty finding at home .... French population growth slowed dramatically
during the first half of the nineteenth century and never really recovered until the post-
World War II period.").
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776) ("He has endeavoured to
prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither,
and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.").
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Assuming aliens continue to be denied the most basic of political
rights-voting5-there are two solutions one can envision to the dilemma
presented by the fact that a majority of citizen voters at the federal level
consistently back repressive legislation denying other basic rights to aliens.
First, one might transfer power down a level of sovereignty, to the states.
Alternately, one could go up a level, appealing to a higher level of law than
national government. (In some sense, the civil rights movement of the
1960s is a model of this latter sort of approach-seeking to transcend
repressive state laws by evoking transcendent (and legally superior)
national standards of equality to trump them.)
There may be significant benefits to be had from devolving immigration
power (especially over admissions, that is, issuance of visas) to the states, 6
replacing the "downwards spiral" with the "race to the bottom" as states
compete with each other to reap the benefits of increasingly permissive
immigration. If we assume that there is some localization of the most
visible benefits of immigration (for instance, in areas with high-technology
industries dependent on a steady influx of highly skilled workers from
abroad) and that political empathy with noncitizens is strongest in these
areas as well (either because many citizens in these areas are first- or
second-generation immigrants themselves (e.g., New York or California) or
are of older vintage but have a strong cultural identification as a group
formerly subject to immigration discrimination (e.g., Irish or Italian
Americans in Boston)), then citizen-voters in some states might be more
likely to open the gates of their states to immigrants. Those states better
equipped to absorb and benefit from immigrants could open their doors
without being inhibited by the marginal political resistance added at the
national level by voters in less-receptive states. If the economic benefits of
immigration predicted by theory were then verified empirically in the
"laboratories" of those states implementing permissive immigration
policies, other states might follow the lead of liberalizing states.
However, topic of this essay is the opposite "federalizing" approach: the
appeal to the higher power of international law, in particular as a limitation
on draconian legislation aimed at making it easier to deport aliens,
(Obviously, international law will have less to say about wholesale
5. Although voting, as the most fundamental of political rights, is typically considered
exclusive to the citizenry--"the most common form of tyranny in human history," as
Michael Walzer puts it, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 62 (1983)-there is, of
course, no reason to assume that aliens must be denied the right to vote. Indeed, throughout
most of the history of the United States (from the founding onward), aliens voted in local,
state, and even federal elections, although the practice rapidly vanished by the 1920s. See
RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 15-40 (2006).
6. For instance, one proposal set forth by Davon Collins would have the federal
government set an annual national quota but then allocate visas to state governments
(perhaps by population, perhaps based on past rates of immigration to those states) and then
let the states experiment with different arrangements for parsing them out-or not using
them at all. See Davon M. Collins, Note, Toward a More Federalist Employment-Based
Immigration System, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 349 (2007).
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immigration policy-the setting of immigrant visa policy-than it will
about the rights of aliens already here to remain here.) There have been a
small handful of examples in the last decade of judges looking to
international law to find limitations on the power of immigration authorities
to deport aliens.7  In those cases, however, the lever for introducing
international law into the discussion has been some latent ambiguity in the
statutes themselves; the courts, analyzing the ambiguity, have attempted to
resolve it by interpreting the statute so as not to violate norms of
international law.
I believe that there is a much more fundamental level on which
international law can be brought to bear against repressive immigration
legislation-even in the absence of statutory ambiguity. In the remainder
of this piece, I sketch out a theory for how international law may
fundamentally limit the power of Congress to legislate in the field. That
theory can be summarized in a single sentence: Congress's power to
regulate immigration is not enumerated anywhere in the text of the U.S.
Constitution; instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently
characterized it as a power "inherent in sovereignty," created by-and
therefore limited by-international law. As international law norms emerge
over time, they may diminish Congress's power (so often described as
"plenary") to act in this field.
I also argue that existing international law norms regarding the right to
family integrity and association-the right to live together as a family-
already provide significant protections to aliens facing deportation who
have strong family ties to the United States. The right to family integrity in
international law subsumes at least two norms: a prohibition against
arbitrary family separation-without a hearing or possibility of
discretionary relief-and a requirement of proportionality between the state
interest underlying the separation and the hardship to the affected
individuals.
I. THE RETROACTIVITY CASES: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY AS AN ENTRtIE
FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
As noted above, there have been two recent cases where a federal court
has found that international law places limitations on the ability of
immigration officials to remove aliens, notwithstanding a statute that
arguably removes official discretion to do otherwise. Both cases-Maria v.
7. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other
grounds, Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussed in detail infra text
accompanying notes 11-28); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
The district court reached a similar conclusion in Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd in part on other grounds and question certified sub nom. Henderson
v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998). For a discussion of the background and procedural
history of Mojica, see Sara A. Rodriguez, Exile and the Not-So-Permanent Resident: Does
International Law Require a Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for the Non-Citizen
Convicted of Certain Crimes?, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 483, 495-96 (2006).
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McElroy8 and Beharry v. Reno 9-were first decided before Judge Jack
Weinstein in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
At issue in these cases was the continued availability of discretionary
relief from deportation for aliens who were rendered removable by dint of
their criminal convictions. Prior to 1996, the immigration statutes provided
broad leeway for immigration judges to consider individual circumstances
and grant relief from deportation at the judge's discretion, even when the
statute allowed for removal of the alien.10 However, aliens rendered
deportable by dint of their convictions for "aggravated felonies" were
excluded from the possibility of such "compassionate" hearings and
discretionary relief. The 1996 Acts expanded the definition of "aggravated
felony," sweeping in many drug crimes and other crimes that had not
previously been considered "aggravated" for purposes of foreclosing
several categories of discretionary relief.
Theft offenses had, prior to 1996, been considered "aggravated" if they
resulted in a sentence of five years or more. The 1996 Acts changed the
threshold to one year. Don Beharry, the petitioner in Beharry, was one of
the many affected by this change. I I Beharry was a Trinidadian national
who came to the United States as a child; he had a young daughter who,
born in the United States, was a U.S. citizen. Beharry's criminal conduct
took place in July 1996, before the passage of the laws that redefined his
crime as an "aggravated felony," but his sentence was passed down in
November 1996, after the acts had passed into law. 12 His case thus raised
retroactivity questions that were not clearly answered by the text of the
1996 statutory amendments or by the usual sources of interpretation to
which one would turn to resolve such mysteries. 13 The Supreme Court had
8. 68 F. Supp. 2d 206.
9. 183 F. Supp. 2d 584.
10. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293-97 (2001) (recounting history of section
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
11. Full disclosure: Don Beharry was also a client of the Center for Constitutional
Rights, which argued his case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
12. See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
13. The legislative history of the 1996 Acts is generally unenlightening. The 1996
Acts-the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), enacted first, and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)-were
notable for the great speed with which they were drafted and rushed into law. See Claudia
Wilner, Note, "We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist": AEDPA Meets the
Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1458 (2002) ("AEDPA was a hastily
drafted statute, enacted as part of a highly politicized legislative response to the Oklahoma
City bombing in 1995."); Alexander Rundlet, Comment, Opting for Death: State Responses
to the AEDPA's Opt-In Provisions and the Need for a Right to Post-Conviction Counsel, 1
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661, 704 (1999) ("The result [of AEDPA's rushed drafting], as the cases
reveal, has been sloppy legislation .... ); Jacqueline P. Ulin, Note, A Common Sense
Reconstruction of the INA's Crime-Related Removal System: Eliminating the Caveats from
the Statue of Liberty's Welcoming Words, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1549, 1558 n.50 (2000) ("As
other commentators have noted ... the [IIRIRA] legislation is sloppy." (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Interestingly, an examination of the legislative history of the relevant
statutes indicates not only that Congress did not intend to violate international law, but also
that Congress remains committed to family unification, which had long been a central
2008]
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announced in INS v. St. Cyr that where the conviction predated the 1996
statutory amendments, aliens would be entitled to a hearing under
section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) if the statute
as it existed prior to the 1996 amendments would have permitted section
212(c) relief at the time of conviction. However, Beharry's convictions
were after the passage of the 1996 Acts. His eligibility for relief under
another discretionary relief provision of the immigration statute 14 remained,
in Judge Weinstein's view, ambiguous, 15 and on the lever of statutory
ambiguity the force of international law came to bear on the retroactivity
question.
Courts are accustomed to the idea of interpreting ambiguous statutes so
as to avoid meanings that would raise serious questions as to the statute's
constitutionality-the doctrine of "constitutional doubt." Similarly
commonplace in the law is an avoidance doctrine based on international law
rather than constitutional law. In both instances, the touchstone is statutory
ambiguity.
The Supreme Court has long held that courts must interpret statutes to
avoid conflict with international law whenever possible, first enunciating
this principle in Talbot v. Seeman.16 In Talbot, the Court considered the
application of a statute regulating the salvage payable on "ships and
goods... re-taken from the enemy."' 17 The Court found that the statute
would conflict with international law if applied to all ships taken from the
enemy. Although "[t]he words of the act would certainly admit of this
construction,"' 8 the Court interpreted the statute to apply only to the
narrower category of captures permitted by international law. In the words
of Chief Justice John Marshall, "the laws of the United States ought not...
be construed as to infract the common principles and usages of nations, or
the general doctrines of national law."' 19 "By this construction," the Chief
Justice concluded, "the act of congress will never violate those principles
which we believe, and which it is our duty to believe, the legislature of the
United States will always hold sacred." 20 Similarly, in Murray v. Schooner
principle of our immigration policy. The House report for the IIRIRA declares that "[t]he
preservation of the nuclear family... should continue to be a cornerstone of U.S.
immigration policy." H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 134 (1996). Congress intended to give
"highest priority in the immigration system to unification of the nuclear family." Id. at 171.
14. The central provision at issue in Beharry was section 212(h), which allowed waiver
of deportation under special circumstances for aliens whose deportation would result in
substantial hardship to a citizen spouse or child.
15. The Second Circuit had announced in a pre-INS v. St. Cyr case that, where crimes
predated the change in law but the convictions did not, section 212(c) relief would be
foreclosed. See Domond v. INS, 244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001). Judge Jack Weinstein's
opinion seemed to indicate that he believed Domond v. INS might be overturned. See
Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 589, 605.
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43-45 (1801).
17. Id. at43.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 44.
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Charming Betsy,2 1 the Supreme Court interpreted a statute that on its face
authorized seizure of neutral vessels in violation of customary international
law. The Court nevertheless held the statute invalid. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Marshall elaborated the doctrine of statutory construction that
affirmed the importance of international law as a guide to statutory
construction by declaring that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains." 22
The modem Court has frequently turned to international law to assist in
the interpretation of congressional enactments, including the INA. 23 The
notion that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains," often referred to
as the "Charming Betsy rule," has lead to a corollary "clear statement" rule:
statutes should be presumed to conform to international law unless
Congress has expressed a clear intent to the contrary. The Charming Betsy
Court itself said as much, and the position is reflected in the modem
Restatement.
24
21. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
22. Id. at 118.
23. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-41 (1987) (international law
used as a guide to the construction of Refugee Act of 1980 and the INA); see also
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (construing statute so as not to abrogate
preexisting executive agreements); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (construing labor relations statute so as not to violate
customary rules of maritime jurisdiction); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953)
(applicability of statute determined by customary maritime law in the absence of clearly
expressed congressional intent to the contrary); cf Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Though it clearly has constitutional authority
to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary
international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe."). See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt,
The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 1103 (1990).
24. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 119 ("extraordinary intent" of Congress to
violate the law of nations must be "plainly expressed" to be given effect by the courts);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(l)(a)
(1987) ("An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of
an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede
the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be
fairly reconciled.").
The Supreme Court has often invoked a "clear statement" rule of construction with
regard to statutes that would otherwise contradict earlier-in-time treaty obligations, even
though statutes are often said to stand at parity with treaties. See Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) ("There is... a firm and obviously sound
canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional
action."); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) ("A treaty will not be deemed to
have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of
Congress has been clearly expressed."); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559-60
(1884) (creating exception to a statutory scheme in order to avoid a conflict with an earlier
internationally binding treaty; Court would not deem a treaty abrogated "unless compelled to
do so by language so clear and positive as to leave no room to doubt that such was the
intention of the legislature").
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In Beharry's case, Judge Weinstein found that Congress failed to
adequately express in the 1996 statutes whether it intended the amendments
to apply retroactively to people like Beharry, whose conviction occurred
after passage but whose crime occurred before it. Under section 212(h) of
the INA, Beharry might have qualified for a discretionary waiver of
deportation if he could have shown that his deportation would result in a
substantial hardship to his citizen child. If the 1996 bars on discretionary
relief did apply, they would foreclose relief. Turning to international law,
Judge Weinstein found-from a variety of sources, including both treaties
and customary international law-an international law norm against
arbitrary separation of families, 25 which he interpreted to be violated by a
rule that demanded deportation automatically for persons thrust into the
"aggravated felon" category by Congress in 1996, with no consideration
whatsoever for the hardship on an innocent citizen child or the equities for
the parent facing removal. Invoking the Charming Betsy doctrine, Judge
Weinstein interpreted the statute to leave open the possibility of
discretionary relief for the "small subset of... aliens who would otherwise
be ineligible for section 212(h) relief' because they were "convicted of an
'aggravated felony' as defined after they committed their crime, but ... not
so categorized when they committed the crime." 26 "It would be a violation
of international law to categorically deny to all members of this group" any
possibility of relief.27 Accordingly, he ordered that Beharry was "entitled
to a hearing at which a broad discretion to exclude may be exercised by the
INS," but at which relief would at least be available.28
25. See infra Part III.
26. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 605 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other
grounds, Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
27. Id. at 604-05.
28. Id. at 605. The "compassionate hearing" ordered by Judge Weinstein never took
place. Id. at 604. The Second Circuit eventually overturned the judgment on other grounds,
finding that Beharry had failed to exhaust his remedies by raising these international-law-
based arguments in his administrative proceedings, and thus that the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Beharry, 329 F.3d 51. The Center for Constitutional Rights
moved the panel for reconsideration on a variety of grounds. Due to an administrative error,
the court of appeals did not realize that a petition for rehearing had been filed for several
weeks. Eventually, it issued a revised opinion, adding a single footnote asserting that it
would have been an abuse of discretion for Beharry to prevail on these facts. Oddly, because
of the delay engendered by the administrative error, the bound hardcover volume of the
Federal Reporter does not include the footnote; the reissued opinion, which is available on
LEXIS, is the only one that contains it. Cf Beharry v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2171, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8279, at *3 n.1 (2d Cir. May 1, 2003, revised July 24, 2003) ("But even if the
exhaustion requirement here is not jurisdictional, we believe that it would be an abuse of
discretion on the facts of this case for the district court to exercise jurisdiction.").
In an unpublished opinion, a panel of the Second Circuit eventually rejected similar
arguments made by a similarly (though not identically) situated petitioner. See Gordon v.
Mule, 153 F. App'x 39, 41 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (Gordon-in contrast to Beharry-may not
have qualified for section 212(h) relief at the time of conviction in any event because his
conviction involved the sale of heroin).
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II. BEYOND STATUTORY AMBIGUITY: DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE
POWER TO LEGISLATE IN THE IMMIGRATION FIELD IN VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The sort of argument presented in Beharry was useful only because
immigration law has seen its share of ambiguities in the last decade-plus-
especially as to retroactive application of absolute bars to discretionary
relief. (Anyone who clerked in the federal courts from about 1996 to 2000
is intimately familiar with the problems created by those ambiguities.) But
the approach predicated on statutory ambiguity is of limited long-term
utility to advocates-all the more so as 1996 drifts increasingly farther back
into history, and fewer immigration cases involving pre-1996 convictions
find their way into the federal courts. 29
There is, however, a much more fundamental argument--one thoroughly
anticipated by Judge Weinstein's opinion in Beharry3°-for asserting that
international law places limits on congressional power to create oppressive
deportation standards. As set forth above, the Charming Betsy canon places
limitations on the ease with which legislation will be read to violate
international law, but it does not suggest that Congress cannot break
derogable tenets of international law, should that be Congress's clearly
stated intent. In contrast, the argument on which I would like to focus
suggests that international law affects not the way in which we should
29. The exhaustion requirement hesitantly implied in Beharry's Second Circuit panel
opinion would, if it were actually read as binding and enforced by the courts, further reduce
the usefulness of these arguments, though it did not stop at least one enterprising
petitioner-Alfien Gordon-from raising, pro se, the arguments made in Beharry during his
administrative appeals. See Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant at 4-6, 6 n.4, Gordon v. Mul&,
No. 02-2051 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2005).
30. Judge Weinstein's opinion in Beharry turned on statutory ambiguity and the
Charming Betsy canon. However, the following argument was set forth in the opinion:
Like admiralty, immigration law is founded on international law. The Supreme
Court has repeated that the basis for Congress's extremely broad power over aliens
comes not from the Constitution itself, but from international law. "It is an
accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions." It is because of international norms that
Congress has such broad authority:
That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice
that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal
confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state.
Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien and we leave the
law on the subject as we find it.
The Harisiades court further noted that "a State can expel even domiciled aliens
without so much as giving the reasons." As authority for this proposition, the
Court cited to Oppenheim's 1920 treatise (3d ed.) on international law. That
treatise has, of course, been superceded ....
Since [C]ongress's power over aliens rests at least in part on international law,
it should come as no shock that it may be limited by changing international law
norms.
Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 598 (citations omitted) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)).
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interpret Congress's acts after the fact, but rather that it curtails Congress's
very power to legislate, at the root rather than the branch.
Most discussions of Congress's powers begin with the text of Article I.
It is a commonplace of legal education to assume that there are no federal
powers that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 31 If that
were true, however, we might have no federal immigration law-because
the power to regulate immigration generally 32 is nowhere described in the
Constitution's text. There is a Naturalization Clause, allowing Congress to
set uniform standards for naturalization 33-but there is no corresponding
immigration clause.
Given today's pervasive control of immigration by the federal
government, this simple point seems astonishing to most students (and
lawyers!) who encounter it for the first time. Keep in mind that until 1875
there was really almost no direct federal regulation of immigration. At the
time of the founding, as alluded to in the introduction, the federal
government generally encouraged free immigration.34 Throughout our first
century of nationhood, some states regulated migration through fees and
rare exclusion provisions for paupers or criminals.35
31. See, e.g., McCullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it
can exercise only the powers granted to it ... is now universally admitted.").
32. Of course, the Slave Migration Clauses are an exception to the general absence of an
immigration power in the Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for
each Person.")
33. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have power ... [t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.").
34. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1, 98-99 (2002) ("Federal activity in the immigration area was minimal during
the pre-Civil War period. The federal government's express policy was to encourage
settlement in the new nation, and naturalization was extended to free white residents.
Federal legislation was adopted to ensure the health and safety of passengers and to grant
duty-free admission to their personal and professional possessions. No meaningful federal
restrictions on immigration were imposed." (footnotes omitted)); Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834
(1993) ("[T]he myth [that the borders of the U.S. were legally open prior to the 1870s] has a
substantial foundation in fact: U.S. legal policy warmly welcomed certain kinds of
immigration, and restrictive laws were often poorly enforced. Neither Congress nor the
states attempted to impose quantitative limits on immigration." (footnote omitted)).
35. See Neuman, supra note 34, at 1841 ("State opposition to the immigration of persons
convicted of crime continued a longstanding dispute of the colonial period. The sentencing
of felons to transportation to America and their shipment to the colonies as indentured
servants had sparked repeated protests, including Benjamin Franklin's famous proposal to
ship rattlesnakes to England in return. Several colonies attempted to pass restrictive
legislation, but after the enactment of the Transportation Act of 1718 such legislation was
frequently vetoed by the British government. Independence released the states from that
control, but also widened the field by tempting other European nations to dump their
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The question whether Congress had power over immigration under the
Commerce Clause-a question tied up as much with the debates over
slavery as with concerns over general immigration-was for a long time
unresolved. One of the early cases touching on the issue was New York v.
Miln,36 a challenge to a New York State statute requiring reporting of all
foreign passengers on board ships brought into the port of New York. 37
The state defended the law as a valid exercise of the police powers,
claiming that to invalidate it would affect many southern states' restrictions
on entry and passage of free blacks. George Miln, a ship captain, argued
that the reporting requirement affected foreign commerce, a field where
Congress held exclusive power. The Court rejected this "dormant"
international Commerce Clause argument. 38 However, a decade later, a
sharply divided Supreme Court held by a five-to-four vote-with no
majority opinion, and several lengthy concurrences-that state head taxes39
trenched on dormant federal Commerce Clause powers (and/or other
dormant federal powers, based in the Taxation, Migration, or Naturalization
Clauses as well) in a field Congress had occupied with legislation.40 As
late as 1884, federal head taxes were upheld on Commerce Clause
grounds. 4 1
convicts in the United States."). Limitations on the migration of slaves-and of free blacks
as well-were imposed by many states as well. See Cleveland, supra note 34, at 98.
36. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
37. "New York was receiving 60,500 immigrants annually, and ... argued that it should
not be required to bear the cost of the Western states' demand for 'emigrati' by supporting
those who entered and became a burden on the city." Cleveland, supra note 34, at 100.
38. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 136-37 ("But how can this apply to persons? They are not
the subject of commerce: and not being imported goods, cannot fall within a train of
reasoning founded upon the construction of a power given to congress to regulate commerce
.... "). In the Passenger Cases, Justice James Moore Wayne later argued that this language
did not enjoy the support of a majority of the Court. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283, 410-11 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring).
39. The majority all agreed that nothing they said limited the ability of states to exclude
blacks. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 406 (McLean, J., concurring); id. at
426, 428 (Wayne, J., concurring); id. at 457 (Grier, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 408 (McLean, J., concurring) (arguing that passengers are the subjects of
commerce and that Congress has exclusive power to regulate them); id. at 426 (Wayne, J.,
concurring) (arguing that state immigration laws are inconsistent with the Naturalization
Clause); id. at 440-42 (Catron, J., concurring) (concluding that "Congress has covered, and
has intended to cover, the whole field of legislation over this branch of commerce").
41. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) ("[C]ongress [has] the power
to pass a law regulating immigration as a part of [the] commerce of this country with foreign
nations .... "). Previous cases had come to the same result, finding that Congress had
exclusive power over the field under the Commerce Clause. See People v. Compagnie
G~n~rale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 60, 63 (1883) (holding that "[iut has been so
repeatedly decided by this court that such a tax ... is a regulation of commerce with foreign
nations, confided by the Constitution to the exclusive control of Congress," and that the
"legislation [at issue] covers the same ground as the New York statute, and they cannot
coexist"); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) ("The passage of laws which
concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to
Congress, and not to the States."); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875)
("[T]he transportation of passengers from European ports to those of the United States has
attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that time to other branches
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Curiously, perhaps, the federal government-which until the Head
Money Cases had never been party to an immigration case before the
Supreme Court42-chose not to defend its power to legislate over the field
of immigration on the ground that this power was part of the Commerce
Clause. As Professor Sarah H. Cleveland's exhaustively thorough research
into the briefing of the early federal immigration cases demonstrated, the
government instead relied on the theory that the federal power over
immigration was part of a set of powers inherent in sovereignty-that is, the
power to regulate immigration of aliens was
implied in [the] very existence of independent government anterior to the
adoption of a constitution ....
It cannot be a valid objection [to the statute] that.., it does not come
within any phrase in the . . . Constitution. . . .As to foreign
Governments and non-resident foreigners the United States is not of
merely enumerated powers .... As to them, it has all the powers
which according to international law any sovereign society possesses
43
While the Supreme Court declined to rely on this argument in the Head
Money Cases, the Court showed its willingness to rely on the notion of
"powers inherent in sovereignty" in other cases of this era that grew out of
challenges to the expansion of national powers in the wake of the Civil
War.44 At the same time, the Court was paring back the scope of the
federal government's Commerce Clause powers over areas other than
immigration. 45 Within the course of a decade, the Court would make a
permanent turn away from grounding federal immigration power in the
Commerce Clause, instead finding that it was among those powers that
"according to international law any sovereign [nation] possesses."
The Chinese Exclusion Cases marked this turn. In a series of cases
decided between 1889 and 1893, the Court rejected the notion that the
of commerce. It has become a part of our commerce with foreign nations, of vast interest to
this country ...."); id. at 272-74 ("[T]his whole subject has been confided to Congress by
the Constitution ....");
42. Cleveland, supra note 34, at 110.
43. Id. at 111 (first, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1884) (Congress could exercise "powers
belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not expressly withheld from
Congress by the Constitution"); The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 555-56
(1870) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The United States is not only a government, but it is a
National government, and the only government in this country that has the character of
nationality.... [I]t is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time
of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as
such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions.").
45. See, e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that the
Sherman Antitrust Act did not allow the federal government to prevent the formation of a
monopoly in the manufacture of sugar via merger of five Pennsylvania companies); Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not preempt Iowa law
prohibiting manufacture of alcohol, even if intended for export out of state).
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immigration power was part of the Commerce Clause power and instead
held that Congress's power over immigration derived from "powers
inherent in sovereignty." In the first of these cases, Chae Chan Ping v.
United States,46 "the United States made no effort to defend the federal
action"-retroactive termination of a right to renter the United States for a
Chinese national who had been a resident here before the change in law-
"under the Commerce Clause." 47 But unlike in the Head Money Cases, the
Court took up the gambit and held unanimously that Congress's power over
immigration was rooted in the inherent powers of sovereign nations:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over
its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.
It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be
to that extent subject to the control of another power....
... [T]he United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their
subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to
independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its
entire territory....
. . . [Such power is] too clearly within the essential attributes of
sovereignty to be seriously contested.48
"In sum, the power [to exclude aliens] derived from international law." 49
(Indeed, as a source of international law (for the practice of other nations),
Chae Chan Ping itself would be cited by a court in the United Kingdom
two years later as a ground for a power to exclude returning aliens.) 50
Three years later, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States51 reached the Court.
Speaking for an eight to one majority, Justice Horace Gray spelled out in
the clearest possible words what had been implicit in Chae Chan Ping-the
principle that Congress's power over aliens was an incident of international
law:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or
to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see
46. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
47. Cleveland, supra note 34, at 126.
48. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04, 607.
49. Cleveland, supra note 34, at 132.
50. Id. at 132-33, 133 n.910 (citing Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, [1891] A.C. 272
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Sup. Ct. of Vict.)).
51. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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fit to prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the national
government .... 52
The petitioner in Nishimura Ekiu was an alien without prior connection
to the United States-she was arriving for the first time, seeking out her
husband who was here. In May of 1892, the draconian Geary Act was
passed, mandating that previously lawful Chinese residents carry a
certificate of residency, register, or be subject to expulsion. "[T]he first
expulsion measure adopted since the 1798 Alien Act," it provoked massive
civil disobedience, and the test cases that went before the Supreme Court5 3
divided the Justices. Notwithstanding its polarization over the judgment,
the Court reaffirmed Nishimura Ekiu's holding that Congress's power over
immigration was rooted in the law of nations-in those provisions of
international law outlining the powers of sovereign nations.
That holding was never rejected by the twentieth-century Court; indeed,
it was restated explicitly in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.54 Federal power
over immigration, then, is derived from powers inherent in sovereignty, and
those powers inherent in sovereignty are defined by and grounded in
international law. But the law of nations is (and always has been) flexible,
susceptible to change, as new norms emerge. As Judge Weinstein put it in
Beharry, "Since [C]ongress's power over aliens rests at least in part on
international law, it should come as no shock that it may be limited by
changing international law norms. ' 55 The inquiry as to how international
law might limit the ability of today's Congress to legislate in the field of
immigration thus necessarily depends on the current-day state of
international law governing the rights of states and aliens, a topic to which I
now turn.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS PLACING LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL
POWER OVER IMMIGRATION
Having established that international law is the foundation stone of
Congress's immigration power, what sorts of limitations on that power
might we find in international law? This question finally brings me back to
the theme of our Symposium panel: the role of international bodies in
influencing United States policy. American courts typically look to a
diverse set of sources to ascertain emergent norms of international law: the
practice of nations, works of jurists, and, of course, judicial decisions from
transnational and municipal courts alike. Despite the fact that the United
States leads the developed world in immigration-no country but Canada
52. Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
53. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
54. 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952) (describing the "traditional power of the Nation over
the alien," "confirmed by international law"); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
765 (1972) ("ancient principles of the international law of nation-states" justify measures
against excludible aliens); Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556 (1913) ("It is admitted that
sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens .... ").
55. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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really comes close to our experience, in terms of volume of immigration-
most of the interesting law on international law norms affecting aliens is
coming from elsewhere, particularly the European Union and the European
Court of Human Rights.
A variety of international law instruments recognize a right to family
integrity and association. While that right is recognized as fundamental and
nonderogable, it is not immediately obvious how it should translate into
practice in terms of specific restrictions on national power. The most
significant principle that has emerged in the European jurisprudence is what
I would call the "proportionality principle": that family separation is so
burdensome to the individuals involved that the state may justify it only
with the strongest of countervailing interests. In application, the
proportionality principle means that courts must weigh the public interest
asserted by the state to make sure it is proportional to the hardship entailed
in an individual case.
Another right that has been asserted on behalf of a number of noncitizens
whose appeals have reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit-Don Beharry, Alfien Gordon, Frederic Lake-is a procedural right
against arbitrary interference with the right to family integrity and
association. In practice, this means that states cannot arbitrarily interfere
with the right of immigrants to live together with their family-typically,
with citizen children or spouses-by deporting them without at least a
hearing allowing individualized consideration of the hardship this would
present to their families.
Some amount of individual discretion is a theme connecting these two
principles. (That common theme is one reason the two principles are
mingled in the sources of international law discussed below, including the
case law.) This is particularly significant since the removal of discretion
has been the trend running through much of immigration law since 1996-
roughly half of deportable aliens got some form of discretionary relief
before the Republican Congress began to create vast categories of
removable aliens for whom discretion was unavailable-"aggravated
felons" and so forth.
A. The Right to Family Integrity Is a Fundamental and Nonderogable
Human Right Recognized by Customary International Law
The right to family life, and more specifically rights to family integrity
and association-that is, the right to live together as a family-are well-
established fundamental rights recognized in international law. As the
International Court of Justice affirmed in 1989, "[t]he integrity of a
person's family and family life is a basic human right protected by
prevailing principles of international law which derive not only from
conventional international law or customary international law but from
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general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. '56 Indeed, as the
subsequent section will demonstrate, the right to family life is widely
recognized and all states are bound to respect it.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 57 unanimously
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (U.N.) in 1948,
expressly states that "[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State," 58 and that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his... family. '59
Although the declaration is not a treaty, its provisions have been widely
recognized as binding customary international law,60 and courts have
treated it as such.61
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),62 a
treaty ratified by the United States, 63 is today one of the most well
established and widely subscribed to treaties in the international law canon.
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1966, the ICCPR
is the product of a multinational effort under the auspices of the United
Nations to codify the rights of the Universal Declaration in treaty form.
The ICCPR reiterates the principle that family is the "natural and
56. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177, 210-11 (Dec. 15)
(separate opinion of Judge Evensen) (internal quotation omitted).
57. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
58. Id. art. 16(3).
59. Id. art. 12.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 701, reporters' note 6 (1987) ("[T]he Declaration has become the accepted general
articulation of recognized rights.").
61. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (entered into force for the United States Sept.
8, 1992).
63. The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH
COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 11 (2004) [hereinafter STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. The Covenant is a binding treaty obligation and is
indicative of customary international law. Even if its provisions are found to be non-self-
executing, the Covenant is still relevant for purposes of determining the status of customary
international law. In proceedings before the Human Rights Committee, the U.S.
Representative indicated that U.S. courts "could refer to the Covenant and take guidance
from it even though it was not self-executing." U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of
America, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Nov. 28, 1995).
The U.S. ratification of the Covenant, coupled with President William J. Clinton's
Executive Order, No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998), suggest that the United
States is fully committed to the protection and promotion of human rights. According to
section 1(a) of the executive order, "[iut shall be the policy and practice of the Government
of the United States, being committed to the protection and promotion of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and implement its obligations under the international
human rights treaties to which it is a party, including the [Covenant]." Id. That executive
order and its commitment to the values espoused by the Covenant has not been repealed or
superseded by any executive order issued by succeeding administrations.
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fundamental group unit of society," entitled to protection by the state,64 and
firmly prohibits "any arbitrary or unlawful interference" with individuals'
right to family life. 65
The American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention),66
adopted in 1969, was signed by the United States in 1977. While not
directly binding on the United States, the American Convention is
indicative of customary international law. 67 Article 11 of the American
Convention states that "[n]o one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive
interference with his private life, his family, [or] his home .... Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks." Article 17(1) further states that "[t]he family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the state." The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which
adjudicates petitions alleging violations of the American Convention, has
stated that the right to family life "is a right so basic to the Convention that
it is considered to be non-derogable even in extreme circumstances. '68
The 1953 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) 69 was also implemented in
order to encourage collective enforcement of the fundamental human rights
recognized by the UDHR. It has been recognized by federal courts to be
one of the "principle sources of fundamental human rights," along with the
ICCPR.70 Article 8 of the European Convention provides that "[e]veryone
has the right to respect for his private and family life" and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has explained that this right includes the
right of family integrity and association-that is, the right to live together as
a family.71 Article 8 states that this right may not be interfered with unless
necessary to further one of a number of compelling state interests. The
ECHR has elaborated this to mean that any interference must be "justified
64. ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 23(1).
65. Id. art. 17.
66. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/treaties/b-32.html.
67. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing American
Convention and European Convention as sources of customary international law); Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Two other principle sources of fundamental
human rights are the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms . . . and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ...").
68. X & Y v. Argentina, Case 10.506, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 38/96,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. $ 96 (1996).
69. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
70. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 797; see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883-84.
71. Scozzari & Giunta v. Italy 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 503, 524; see also Johansen
v. Norway 1996-11I Eur. Ct. H.R. 966, 1001-02 ("[T]he mutual enjoyment by parent and
child of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of family life and...
domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right
protected by Article 8.").
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by a pressing social need and... proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued."72
The right to family life is nonderogable; it cannot be subject to selective
application depending on the immigration status of an individual. The U.N.
General Assembly has declared that it applies to citizens and noncitizens
equally. 73 The U.N. Human Rights Committee (the international body
overseeing implementation of the ICCPR's provisions by its states parties)
in its General Comment 15 held, "[T]he rights set forth in the [ICCPR]
apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her
nationality or statelessness .... [T]he general rule is that each one of the
rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens." 74
B. Proportionality
International law demands that interference with family integrity and
association 75 cannot be arbitrarily imposed. Familiar concepts of due
process equate arbitrariness with a lack of formal rules, laid out in advance,
and a lack of basic procedural protections, particularly notice and
opportunity to be heard and to present and challenge evidence.
Procedurally, arbitrary deportation violates international law, as is
recognized by scholars 76 and by the ICCPR provisions forbidding arbitrary
expulsion generally (discu~sed in Part III.C, below). However, there is a
substantive component as well as a procedural, component to the
arbitrariness inquiry.77 Courts addressing the issue have found it not
sufficient that interference with family life simply pass a threshold of
procedural regularity. Rather, they have held that a state's interference with
72. Ciliz v. Netherlands, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 52.
73. See Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the
Country in Which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, Annex, art. 5(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/144
(Dec. 13, 1985) (aliens enjoy right to family).
74. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens
Under the Covenant, 1-2 (Nov. 4, 1986) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15],
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/bc561aa81bc5d86ecl12563ed004aaalb?
Opendocument.
75. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has opined that the deportation of a person from
a country where close members of his or her family are living constitutes an interference
with that individual's right to his or her family life. See Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius,
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 35/1978, 9.2(b)(2)(i)(2), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978 (1981).
76. Thus the Oppenheim treatise states, "[D]iscretion ... to expel aliens . . . is not
absolute. Thus, by customary international law [the state] must not abuse its right[s] by
acting arbitrarily in taking its decision to expel an alien, and it must act reasonably in the
manner in which it effects an expulsion." I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 940 (Sir
Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
77. "The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even
interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and
objectives of [the ICCPR] .... " U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 16:
The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home, and Correspondence, and Protection of
Honour and Reputation (Art. 17), 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (Mar. 23, 1988).
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an individual's right to family life is legitimate only when it is a response to
a lawful state interest and when the interference with the individual's rights
is outweighed by that state interest. The reasonableness and proportionality
of measures interfering with family integrity and association have to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
1. European Court of Human Rights
The ECHR, which has produced the most developed body of
international human rights jurisprudence on this subject, has issued a
number of opinions that address the tension between immigration law and
noncitizens' fundamental right to family integrity and association. In the
past, U.S. federal courts have relied on the European Convention and
ECHR rulings as an authoritative source of international human rights law
and as "indicative of the customs and usages of civilized nations. '78
Article 8 of the European Convention mandates application of a
proportionality test to the expulsion of noncitizens with strong family ties to
the deporting nation and/or very few links to the country to which they
would be sent. The standard applied by the court assesses whether
deportation is justified by a "pressing social need" and whether the
interference with family life is disproportionate with respect to the public
interest to be protected. 79
In Moustaquim v. Belgium,80 the European Court held that it was
disproportionate to deport a Moroccan national who had arrived in Belgium
when he was two years old and had lived there with all of his immediate
family including his parents and seven siblings until age twenty-one.
Despite Abderrahman Moustaquim's lengthy record of petty criminality, 81
because of the fact that he had almost no links to Morocco and had been
educated entirely in the French language, the court, applying the
proportionality test, found that the balance of equities weighed against
deportation given his strong family ties to Belgium and lack of ties
elsewhere. 82 This reasoning was upheld in several other ECHR cases. 83
78. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1981), and subsequent decisions of the ECHR); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 884 & n.16 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that judicial decisions constitute a source of
customary international law and citing a decision issued by the ECHR); Beharry v. Reno,
183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
79. Berrehab v. Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 15-16 (1988) ("[T]he legitimate
aim pursued has to be weighed against the seriousness of the interference with the
applicants' right to respect for their family life."); see also Ciliz v. Netherlands, 2000-VIII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 265, 284.
80. 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 19-20.
83. See, e.g., Yildiz v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (2003) (noting that a violation of
the right to family life where deportation imposed for shoplifting and traffic offenses on
father with small child born in Austria); Boultif v. Switzerland, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R 119
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Finally, in Slivenko v. Latvia,84 the ECHR found a violation of Article 8
despite the fact that the state interest cited touched on national security.
The case involved a Russian family resident in Latvia for many years. The
husband was posted to Latvia as a Soviet military officer in 1977; he
married in Latvia and raised his child there. 85 Although the Latvian
government asserted a national security interest in expelling all former
military personnel of the occupying Soviet army upon independence, the
court held that to do so, given the family's ties, violated its right to family
life.86
2. United Nations Human Rights Committee
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has examined the implications of
deportation on the right to family life in several cases. It has determined
that a state must make a reasonable determination whether the interference
with family life is proportionate to the state's interests in removing a
specific individual. 87 For example, in Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius,88
the Mauritian government had amended its immigration law so that "alien
husbands of Mauritian women lost their residence status in Mauritius" and
(finding that, despite a robbery conviction, petitioner did not pose a danger to society
proportionate to the hardship of removing him after eight years of marriage to a Swiss
woman who was unlikely to be able to follow him to Algeria); Mokrani v. France, 40 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 123 (2003), available at http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/briguglio/immigrazione-e-
asilo/2003!ottobre/bollettino-ecre-10-03.html (translated summary) (concluding that, since
drug trafficker lived his entire life in France, was seriously involved with a French woman,
and had no ties with his country of origin other than his nationality, his expulsion was
disproportionate to the legitimate state interest); Mehemi v. France, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
1959 (barring deportation of Algerian national whose parents, brothers, sisters, wife, and
three minor children were all French citizens). National courts have reached similar
conclusions. See Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3 (1992) (noting that the
presence of Algerian national's spouse, parents, and four siblings in France and lack of any
links to Algeria outweighed state interest in removal, despite serious criminal convictions);
PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, DEPORTATION
AND THE FAMILY: A REPORT ON THE COMPLAINTS OF MRS. M. ROTH AND MR. C.J. BOOKER,
REP. No. 8, PARLIAMENTARY PAPER NO. 272/1984, (1984) (Declaration of the Rights of the
Child and ICCPR Article 23 violated by order separating noncitizen from long-term
cohabitant and her children).
84. 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 229.
85. Id. at 237-38.
86. See id. at 258-"7.
87. See, e.g., Winata v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 930/2000,
7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (2001) (finding that, in light of petitioners'
fourteen-year residence in Australia and the Australian citizenship of their thirteen-year-old
child, Australian government did not achieve a proper balance between its interest in the
enforcement of immigration law and its duty to refrain from arbitrary interference with
petitioners' family life); Canepa v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No.
558/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (1997); Hopu & Bessert v. France, U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 549/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.I
(1997); Stewart v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996).
88. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 35/1978, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978 (1981).
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could remain only at the grace of the Interior Minister.89 Although the
petitioners' husbands were not facing immediate deportation, the Human
Rights Committee noted that "not only the future possibility of deportation,
but the existing precarious residence situation of foreign husbands
[constitutes] an interference.., with the family life of the Mauritian wives
and their husbands." 90 Accordingly, "the exclusion of a person from a
country where close members of his family are living can amount to an
interference [with the right to family integrity] within the meaning" of
ICCPR Articles 17(1) and 23(1). 91
3. The Proportionality Inquiry Must Take into Account the
Best Interests of the Child
Since the pioneering work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and their
collaborators across various academic fields,92 the "best interests of the
child" has become the guiding principle underlying legislative policy
making and adjudication in almost all matters concerning child welfare. 93
Laws touching on child welfare had historically been oriented toward
adjudicating competing interests of parents. The "best interests" standard
altered the focus, such that in custody cases, the state would now be
expected to act paternalistically to protect the child's interests in cases
where one or both parents were nominally the only parties. This principle
made its first appearance in international law in the 1961 treaty on the
protection of infants,94 wherein, "[f]or the first time, a treaty adopted as a
central principle the protection of the 'interests of the child,' a shift away
from earlier conflicts rules that had been premised solely on the competing
rights of parents." 95 Today the principle is ubiquitous in both municipal
and international law.96
89. Id 1.2.
90. Id. 9.2(b)(2)(i)(3).
91. Id. 9.2(b)(2)(i)(2).
92. Joseph Goldstein was a law professor at Yale, and Anna Freud a renowned child and
developmental psychologist. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
93. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 600 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that, in family law cases
concerning abuse, "the child's welfare predominates over other interests"); 2 AM. JuR. 2D
Adoption § 136 (1994) (noting that, in adoption by unmarried couples, the "best interests" of
the child is the paramount consideration); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 1 (1987)
(noting that the general tenets of family law include the best interests of the child).
94. Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in
Respect of the Protection of Infants, opened for signature Oct. 5, 1961, 658 U.N.T.S. 143.
95. Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International
Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 213, 216-17 (2003).
96. Id. at 225.
2008]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
a. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
The best interests principle is now principally embodied in international
law in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 97 As Judge
Weinstein noted in Beharry, "[t]he CRC has been adopted by every
organized government in the world except the United States." 98 Notably,
the United States does not disagree with the central provisions of the CRC;
to the contrary, it has not yet ratified the CRC due to disputes over several
specific issues relating to abortion, juvenile justice (especially in relation to
capital punishment), 99 and juvenile military recruitment. "While the CRC
is relatively new, it contains many provisions codifying longstanding legal
norms." 100 "Given its widespread acceptance, to the extent that it acts to
codify longstanding, widely-accepted principles of law, the CRC should be
read as customary international law."' 01
The CRC provides at Article 3(1), "In all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration. ' 10 2  In Article 9(1), the
Convention requires that "States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be
separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent
authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with
applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best
interests of the child." 103 Article 9(2) further specifies that "all interested
parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings"
pursuant to Article 9(1).104
The CRC provides that the best interests of the child must be of
paramount concern in any "action[] concerning children." 10 5  It thus
requires at a minimum that the interests of any children of petitioners be
97. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 24(2)(e), U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
98. Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d. at 600. One hundred ninety-three nations have ratified,
acceded to, or accepted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) or succeeded to
such status. Only the United States and Somalia (which lacks a functioning government)
have not. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 97.
99. David P. Stewart, Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 178-82 (1998). The United States became a signatory to the
CRC on February 16, 1995, and the treaty awaits ratification by the Senate. See STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS, supra note 63, at 11; see also S. Res. 144, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REC.
S8400 (1995) (expressing the Senate's disapproval of the CRC).
100. Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
101. Id. at 601.
102. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 97, art. 3, 1.
103. Id. art. 9, 1.
104. Id. art. 9, 2. Both the best interests principle and other norms relevant to this case
are embodied in the CRC. See id. pmbl. (the child should grow up in a family environment);
id. art. 7, 1 (each child shall have, "as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents"); id. art. 16, 1 (protecting children from "arbitrary or unlawful
interference" with their family).
105. Id. art. 3.
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taken into account as a primary consideration at some stage during the
deportation process. This conclusion is not only supported as a matter of
common sense, but also by regional human rights bodies, 106 foreign courts,
and commentators who have recognized that deportation proceedings
directed at a parent clearly amount to an "action concerning children," for
purposes of Article 3(1) of the CRC. 107
As noted above, once the best interests principle began to gain
ascendancy in municipal child welfare law, cases where one or both parents
were nominally the only parties were rendered more complex by the state's
obligation to act paternalistically to protect the child's interests. Similarly,
in immigration cases, the state must act affirmatively to protect each child's
interests, rather than viewing deportation of parents as a stand-alone dispute
between two parties (the alien parent and the government).
b. Domestic and Foreign Case Law on Best Interests of the Child in the
Context of Deportation
The CRC is cited in case law for the proposition that in deportation
decisions, the best interests of the child of the alien facing deportation are to
be taken into account as a primary consideration. Moreover, the general
principles embodied in the CRC have been relied on even when the
Convention itself has not been ratified or implemented into municipal law
through enabling legislation-that is, courts have recognized it as indicative
of customary international law.
Beharry08 and Mojica v. Reno° 9 -- both decided by Judge Weinstein-
are the leading domestic cases relying on the best interests principle to
invalidate summary deportation of persons with strong family ties to the
106. See, e.g., African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 19, 1, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/official-documents/Treaties-%20Conventions_%20Protocols/A
.%20C.%200N%20THE%20RIGHT%20AND%20WELF%200F%20CHILD.pdf
("No child shall be separated from his parents against his will, except when a judicial
authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law, that such separation is in the
best interest of the child.").
107. See, e.g., Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183
C.L.R. 273, 289 (Austl.) ("A broad reading and application of the provisions in Art 3, one
which gives to the word "concerning" a wide-ranging application, is more likely to achieve
the objects of the Convention."); see also Jonathan Todres, Emerging Limitations on the
Rights of the Child: The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law,
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 159, 172 (1998) ("The domestic courts of several States
Parties have adopted a broad reading of the 'in all actions concerning children' phrase.
Cases relating to the deportation of non-citizen parents of citizen children have been deemed
to be 'actions concerning children' by some courts."); id. at 172 n.59 (listing cases from
Australia and New Zealand).
108. 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that international law places
limitations on the ability of immigration officials to remove aliens, notwithstanding a statute
that arguably removes official discretion to do otherwise).
109. 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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United States. 11° Judge Weinstein held that the categorical denial of
hearings to aliens convicted of certain crimes would violate principles of
customary international law which require balancing of equities and, where
the noncitizen has a citizen child, of the best interests of that child as
well. 1 In Beharry, Judge Weinstein looked to the CRC as evidence of
customary international law. 112 In order to bring the INA into harmony
with international law, Judge Weinstein remanded the cases to the Agency
for hearings on the possibility of discretionary relief from deportation based
on the hardship to the alien's families." 13
Foreign courts have similarly applied the CRC to require that the best
interests of the child be given primary consideration in the context of
deportation. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that "it is an
interference of a very serious order to split up a family. Such a step must be
supported by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the interests
of the child."1 14 Canadian and Australian courts, relying on the CRC, have
reached similar conclusions. 115
The Inter-American Commission has also applied the best interests
principle in the immigration context. In a 2000 report on the status of
asylum seekers in Canada, 16 the Commission held that "the absence of any
procedural opportunity for the best interests of the child to be considered in
proceedings involving the removal of a parent or parents raised serious
concerns." 117 While the state has the right and duty to maintain public
order through immigration control, "that right must be balanced against the
harm that may result to the rights of the individuals concerned in the
particular case."118
C. The Right to Be Free from Procedurally Arbitrary Expulsion
The right to be free from arbitrary expulsion is also independently
recognized in several international instruments. Article 9 of the ICCPR
110. In Mojica v. Reno, one petitioner arrived in the United States at age twelve and lived
here for nine years, had a large family in the United States (but had no children himself), and
had no immediate family in his native Panama. Id. at 138. The other petitioner had lived
here for twenty-five years, was married, and had two citizen children. Id. at 140.
111. See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
112. Id. at 601.
113. Id. at 604-05; Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 182.
114. Olsson v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 33-34 (1988); see also Scozzari &
Giunta v. Italy, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 506 (quoting Olsson).
115. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,
69-70, 76 (Can.) (reading statute in light of CRC to allow alien mother of four citizen
children relief); Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183
C.L.R. 273, 290-91 (Austl.) (administrative decisions must conform with CRC).
116. See Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 40 rev. (Feb. 28, 2000), available at http://www.cidh.org/
countryrep/Canada2000en/table-of-contents.htm.
117. Id. 159.
118. Id. 166.
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provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention [or
exile]."" 19 Furthermore, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and
obligations.1 20
Article 13 of the ICCPR generally requires an individualized review
before a state may expel a person legally present in its territory: "An alien
. . .may be expelled . . .only in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national
security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his
expulsion and to have his case reviewed by [a] competent authority."' 121
The Human Rights Committee has concluded that Article 13 "is applicable
to all procedures aimed at the obligatory departure of an alien, whether
described in national law as expulsion or otherwise." 122 In both Hammel v.
Madagascar123 and Giry v. Dominican Republic,124 the Human Rights
Committee held that the Covenant had been violated because aliens were
not afforded an opportunity to submit the reasons against their expulsion.
The European Convention similarly recognizes the right of lawfully
resident aliens to submit reasons against their expulsion in fair
proceedings. 125 Just as deportation without a hearing on the impact on
family members would constitute arbitrary interference with family
integrity, deportation without affording an opportunity to demonstrate a
case for discretionary relief would violate the right against arbitrary
expulsion in circumstances where the deportation would tear apart a family.
D. Conclusions
1. Only the Strongest State Interests May Justify Family Separation
International law makes clear that family separation is so inherently
burdensome to the individuals involved that the state may justify it only
with the strongest of countervailing interests. In some cases this means that
certain laws allowing deportation that would separate a noncitizen parent
from a citizen child may not be permissible even where procedural
protections (such as the opportunity for a hearing) are provided for in
individual cases. Courts have consistently insisted on balancing the
119. ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 9.
120. Id. art. 14.
121. Id. art. 13 (emphasis added).
122. General Comment No. 15, supra note 74, 9.
123. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 155/1983, 19.2, 20, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/29/D/155/1983 (1987).
124. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 193/1985, 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/39/D/193/1985 (1990).
125. See Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art.1, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117 (entered into force Nov.
1, 1998), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/html/ 17.htm; cf
European Convention, supra note 69, art. 3.
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maintenance of public order and safety against the hardships expulsion
entails for families, stating that family separation in such circumstances
must be "justified by a pressing social need and... proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued."'126 Legal scholars have similarly suggested that
where the state asserts the right to separate families, "there should be a clear
presumption that involuntary family separation violates international law,"
that the state bears the burden of overcoming this presumption, and, against
the interest in family integrity, the state must show that any "competing
interest [is] compelling."' 127
There may thus be circumstances in which deportation for individuals
with citizen children, based on the fact of criminal convictions that fail to
implicate a sufficiently compelling state interest in removal, would violate
international law per se, regardless of whether a hearing was provided
for. 128 European courts have repeatedly come to this conclusion in cases
presenting such facts.
2. The Right to a Hearing Is a Minimum Requirement of International Law
"[T]he rights to be free from arbitrary interference with family life and
arbitrary expulsion are part of customary international law." 129  At a
minimum, international law bars arbitrary interference with family
integrity, and thus mandates that noncitizens cannot lawfully be expelled
from the United States without an opportunity for a hearing to present
evidence of the hardship that such an expulsion would inflict on their
families.
This is the narrow holding reached by the court in Beharry.130 That case
simply held that automatic deportation would violate international law
when applied to an alien who had resided in the United States for over
seven years and who could plausibly argue "extreme hardship" to his family
if deported.13' The district court's conclusion that a hearing was required is
consistent with the conclusions of the numerous foreign and international
jurists described above, as well as the opinions of respected legal
scholars. 132 Where a family will be torn apart by a deportation, with no
individualized consideration of the hardship this will cause on the deported
person or those left behind, and with no opportunity to present evidence or
be heard on this issue, these rights have been violated.
126. Ciliz v. Netherlands, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 265.
127. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 95, at 286.
128. Arguably, deportation should not be allowed at all if the child cannot follow the
parent to his or her country of citizenship. "Some nations... as a general rule bar the
deportation of aliens with citizen children; international law could reasonably be interpreted
to require such a rule." Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
129. Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
130. 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604-05 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
131. Id. at 605.
132. Leading legal scholars have opined that the provisions of the IIRIRA and the
AEDPA that allow for such summary deportation "violate the United States' international
obligations to protect families." Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 95, at 259.
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CONCLUSION
No one can continue to work in the human rights field without being
somewhat inured to the human impact of the law on our clients. By the
same token, there are always cracks in even the most hardened professional
fagade. In my six-plus years at the Center, the most difficult cases I have
had to deal with from a personal standpoint are these family separation
cases-people who came to the United States before they were teenagers,
facing deportation to some country where they cannot speak the language,
have no family or social connections, and on top of all of that are to be
separated from their children. One of the most poignant moments we have
had in this office was the declassification of notes of a meeting with a client
in Guantdnamo who told one of my colleagues "tell my wife to remarry"-
but that kind of situation occurs time and again here at home.
Sadly, these stories seem to have little impact on voters in most of the
parts of the world that receive immigrants. Our own Constitution has
several provisions designed to protect minority groups-both aliens and
citizens-from oppression by the democratically expressed will of political
majorities. It should not be surprising that international law provides
similar protections. Those provisions of international law that provide a
minimum baseline of rights for aliens serve much the same purpose as the
Constitution did during the civil rights movement, allowing resort to a
higher source for basic human rights that may be enforced against local
political majorities-a way of moving up a tier of sovereignty, so to speak.
As such, international law should serve as an important check generally on
the power of democratic states to enforce oppressive immigration
legislation against aliens. But the place of international law in our own
system is a special one, since our own constitutional scheme relies on
international law as the source of authority for Congress's very power over
the field. As the fount of Congress's supposedly "plenary" power over
aliens, international law also provides fundamental limitations on that
power-limitations which we can expect will become more robust with
time, and which, one hopes, federal courts will continue to see fit to
enforce.
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